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Abstract
Social security systems in most industrialized countries face severe financial
problems due to adverse demographic changes. The increase in old–age
dependency, however, will be spread over a period of approximately 50
years. The degree of technological progress necessary to offset the negative
effects of aging might therefore be small. Using models with endogenous
labor supply and with capital accumulation, we demonstrate that under
plausible assumptions, current living standards can be maintained with
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a moderate rate of technological progress. The necessary rate of growth
increases both in the size of the program and in the fraction of agents who
exclusively depend on public pensions in retirement.
Keywords: Social Security, Aging, Technological Progress.
JEL classification: H55, J18, O40.
1 Introduction
Old–age dependency ratios in almost all industrialized countries will increase
dramatically over the next decades due to a sharp decrease in fertility rates and
increasing longevity. This fact raises concerns about the financial burden of
prevalent pay–as–you–go (PAYG) public pension systems. While fertility rates
are notoriously difficult to forecast, the dramatic increase in longevity is an undis-
puted fact. Even if the workforce does not shrink—due to higher participation
rates or to immigration—contribution rates will have to be raised considerably
to maintain benefits at their current level.
Projected dependency rates will grow slowly before they reach a higher value.
In most OECD countries, old–age dependency will only reach its peak around the
year 20451 and will stabilize or even fall thereafter. In these countries, dependency
ratios will on average increase from about 0.25 to about 0.50 in the next 50 years
(see Figure 1 and Table 1). While the projected dependency ratio in 2050 are
moderate for the US and the UK, Italy — as an extreme case — will face a
dependency ratio of approximately 0.65.
Insert Figure 1
1See, for example, United Nations World Population Prospects, and Chand & Jaeger (1996).
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Insert Table 1
The impact of demographic changes on an economy with a PAYG system has
attracted considerable attention in the past two decades. A large fraction of the
previous literature has dealt with macroeconomic consequences of an increase in
old–age dependency ratio, especially its impact on capital accumulation under a
variety of (public) pension systems.2 Other contributions are mainly concerned
with deriving the optimal policy to aging, i.e. the policy a central planner should
pursue to maximize a social welfare function.3 In an important paper, somewhat
related to ours, Cutler, Poterba, Sheiner & Summers (1990) analyse aging under a
variety of assumptions and propose appropriate policy responses. They argue that
the demographic changes in the US do not seem to induce dramatic reductions
in the living standard, but do not analyze the impact of aging on the welfare of
different generations.4
Our paper concentrates on intergenerational equity within the existing public
2A wealth of issues with respect to aging is discussed in an NBER–volume edited by Wise
(1994). Other important contributions include Auerbach, Kotlikoff, Hagemann & Nicoletti
(1989), Masson & Tryon (1990), and Börsch–Supan (1991). Following the work of Auerbach
& Kotlikoff (1987), macroeconomic consequences of aging were also explored in simulated and
calibrated overlapping generations models, as in Rios-Rull (1994), and De Nardi, İmrohoroğlu
& Sargent (1999).
3In recent years the focus of this strand of literature has clearly shifted to the analysis of
privatized social security, and the transition from a PAYG system to a fully funded system.
See for example Feldstein (1995), Kotlikoff (1997), and Huang, İmrohoroğlu & Sargent (1997).
4Cutler et al. derive their results from a Ramsey model. Since agents are assumed to
live infinitely in this framework, their framework does not allow investigating intergenerational
redistribution effects and their consequences for savings. To account for these shortcoming,
Meijdam & Verbon (1997) analyse aging and optimal policy in an OLG model, but do not
consider productivity growth.
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pension systems, rather than on finding the optimal policy for a given (and to
some extent arbitrary) social welfare function. Instead of exploring the impact
of aging under a given (projected) growth path, we reverse the question and
investigate whether technological progress can be expected to be strong enough
to offset the negative impact of unfavorable demographics on the living standard
for all cohorts. The size of the program is taken as given, thus honoring the
implicit social contract between the generations. We also take into account that
living standards not only depend on the rate of technological progress, but also
on agents’ optimal adjustments, in particular on labor supply and on savings
decisions.
If the old–age dependency ratio increases (leaving the structure of the pension
system unchanged), the necessary increase in the tax burden will lower a worker’s
consumption, unless the rise in the share of retirees is offset by a sufficient increase
in gross wage income, which in turn depends on the rate of technological progress.
Our paper can thus be viewed as an attempt to analytically derive an upper bound
on the rate of technological progress required to ensure a non–decreasing living
standard for workers and retirees. Taking into account that aging will be spread
over an extended period of time, we find that the negative impact of aging can
be offset by a rate of technological progress well below the rates experienced in
the last decades. We will also show that the size of the existing public pension
system matters. The more generous the program, the higher the necessary rate
of technological progress.
To get a first idea of the order of magnitude of required techological progress,
we present a simple accounting exercise in section 2, assuming that the increase in
gross wage income parallels productivity growth. Despite its simplicity the model
offers an interesting benchmark case, and anticipates the bounds on technological
4
progress derived from richer models.
Simple accounting does not take into account the optimal reactions of eco-
nomic agents to demographic changes and increases in tax rates. Ultimately,
wage income is determined by labor supply and labor productivity, which in turn
depends (at least partially) on capital accumulation. Whether the necessary in-
crease in tax rates is sustainable can be doubted, mainly because of the negative
impact of increased tax rates on labor supply. The change in labor supply is not
only determined by the change in tax rate. Rather, the joint effect of changes
in the gross wage rate and in the tax rate, i.e. the change in net wage rate, is
decisive for the willingness to work. In section 3, we will present a static model
to compute an upper bound for productivity growth rates, required to avoid the
negative impacts of the rising tax rates on labor supply. We shall see that the
productivity growth has to be larger than the decrease in the share of the working
population.
The provision for old age is one of the most important reasons for savings and
capital formation.5 In that respect, aging is not only bad news. Bohn (1999),
for example, argues that an increase in longevity leads to higher wage rates
and lower interest rates under reasonable assumptions. As people life longer,
moreover, they might want to save more to supplement their pension benefits.
For a given replacement rate, on the other hand, an increase in longevity raises
the contribution rate for social security. The overall effect of aging is therefore
ambiguous, but most likely negative for the transition generations. The baby–
5Gustman & Steinmeier (1999) provide an interesting empirical analysis of the composition
of assets for individuals near retirement for the US. They show that (funded) pension savings
constitutes approximately a quarter of all savings while implicit social security claims make up
another quarter.
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boomers loose twice by facing low wages when young (due to a low capital–labor
ratio) and low interest rates when retired. The following generation — while
enjoying a higher gross wage due to a depening in the capital–labor ratio — will
have to pay higher contributions to finance the pension benefits of the baby–
boomers.
To analyse the impact of unfavorable demographics on capital formation we
endogenous saving–decisons in a stylized overlapping–generations model in sec-
tion 4. We introduce some degree of heterogeneity among individuals by assuming
a fraction of the population to be less productive and lack the foresight to save for
retirement.6 We do not only study the impact of aging on the steady state, but
we also look at the transition generations which have to bear the largest burden.
Like in the static model, we find that in most cases the necessary productivity
growth rates are small compared with the productivity growth rates experienced
in the past.
2 A Back–of–the–Envelope Calculation
To get a first estimate of the necessary growth rate to offset aging, we consider a
simple economy with two types of agents: Working agents constitute a fraction ρ
of the total population and earn a net income of (1−τ )W each, where W is labor
income and τ is the proportional payroll tax used to finance the pension benefits of
the retirees. Let λ denote the replacement rate, i.e. the ratio between the benefit
6These two additional assumptions reflect the principal rationales (pointed out among others
by Feldstein (1985) and Diamond (1965)) for a mandatory public pension system: First the
provision of income for individuals with inadequate savings, and second, some redistribution
from high–income to low–income earners. See also Hu (1996) for an analysis of social security
in the presence of myopic agents.
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B of a retiree, and the after tax labor income of a worker (B = λ(1− τ )W ).7
If the public pension budget has to be balanced, i.e. ρτW = (1 − ρ)B, the
necessary payroll tax amounts to
τ =
(1− ρ)λ





where ψ ≡ 1−ρ
ρ
is the elderly dependency ratio. Suppose now the fraction of
workers shrinks from ρo to ρn. To maintain the current living standard of both
workers and retirees the gross wage income has to increase by a factor g as follows













A growth in labor income of ( ρo
ρn
− 1) = ψn−ψo
1+ψo
at most (for a generous pension
system with λ = 1) is sufficient to avoid a decline in consumption opportunities
induced by higher taxes. If we take the extreme cases of Italy with an increase in
elderly dependency from 0.26 to about 0.65, an increase in gross labor income of
at most 31% would be required. In all other countries an increase in gross wage
income of 25% or less would be enough to offset the impact of higher payroll
taxes. Over a period of roughly 50 years, the rate of growth in gross wage income,
sufficient to offset an increase in the dependency ratio is consequently bounded
by 0.45–0.55% per year. Furthermore, for λ = 1, the tax rate has to increase
from 20% to 40% (for ψ rising from 0.25 to 0.65) or to 33% (for ψ increasing
from 0.25 to 0.5).
As we can see from Table 1, labor productivity growth of the seventies and
eighties has been well above the pessimistic 0.6% for Italian case. As long as
future productivity growth is of the magnitude of previous decades, the prevailing
7Throughout the paper we assume that the (average) replacement rate is not greater than
one, i.e. the benefits are not above the after tax income.
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pension systems seem to be sustainable. The aging induced increase of payroll
tax rates could then be offset by a sufficient increase of gross labor income.
3 Aging and the Supply of Labor
To analyse the impact of aging on labor supply, we consider a static one good
economy. Labor is the only production factor, and the production function is
given by
Y = A · L, (2)
where Y denotes the output, L the labor input, and A labor productivity. Profit
maximisation requires that w = A, with w denoting gross wage rate. As in the
previous section, the population consists of workers and retirees. The working
population is normalized to one, and there are ψ retirees.
We assume identical workers with a utility function U [c, l], where c denotes
consumption and l labor. A worker’s gross income is given by w · l, and is taxed
at a rate of τ to finance retirement benefits of the retirees. Hence, every worker




s.t. : c = (1− τ ) · w · l
The result of this individual optimization yields the worker’s labor supply func-
tion, denoted by l[(1−τ )w]. We assume that it is non–decreasing in the net wage
rate.8 Because we have normalized the number of workers to one, l also denotes
total labor supply.
8If labor supply is decreasing in the net wage rate, an increase in the tax rate has no adverse
effects on the labor supply anyhow.
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For retirees, pension benefits B are the only source of income. They are
financed by the taxes on workers’ income. Balanced budget implies again a the
tax rate τ of ψλ
1+ψλ
, and a net wage rate of w
1+ψλ
.
In equilibrium, labor input must equal labor supply at the going net wage







and labor input in turn determines equilibrium output.
Now we are ready to investigate which increase in productivity is necessary
to offset the negative impacts of aging. If the dependency ratio increases from
ψo to ψn, and productivity increases from Ao to An, the answer is given by the
following theorem:
Theorem 1: If the the dependency ratio increases from ψo to ψn, the replacement





, the following holds: i) the equilibrium net wage rate is not
decreasing, ii) labor input does not decrease, iii) output does not decrease,
iv) net wage income and retirement benefits do not decrease, and v) the
utility of workers as well as retirees does not decrease.










These (in)equalities follow from profit maximization, and the assumptions of the








i.e. the net wage rate does not decrease.
ii) Follows immediately from i) and the assumption that labor supply is non–
decreasing in the net wage rate.
iii) Follows immediately from ii) and the increase in productivity.
iv) Since net wage rate as well as labor input do not decrease, neither does
the net wage income. Due to a fixed proportionality factor between benefits and
net wages, this also holds for retirement benefits.
v) Since retirees’ utility depends only on consumption and since by iv) the
benefits do not decrease, retirees’ utility does not decrease.



















The first inequality is due to the optimality of the workers’ labor supply decision
at the net wage rate of wn
1+λψn
. Furthermore, for any given labor input consump-
tion does not decrease when the net wage rate is non–decreasing. Hence, the
second inequality is implied by the monotonicity of the utility in consumption.
Noting that the left and the right expressions denote worker’s utility at the new
and the old equilibrium, respectively, completes the proof.
Theorem 1 shows that as long as productivity growth is larger than the decrease
in the share of the working population, gross wage rates rise enough to offset the
impact of an increase in the tax rate. Hence the same result as in the previous
section also holds if we allow for the possibility that the aging induced increase
in taxes has a negative impact on labor supply.
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4 Aging and Capital Accumulation
Aging influences the saving decisions of the population, and hence the capital
stock of an economy. Moreover, important aspects of social security, such as
the provision of retirement income for individuals with inadequate savings and
the redistribution to lower income households, have been neglected so far. We
study these issues in a standard version of Diamond’s (1965)’s classical OLG–
model with a PAYG system and heterogeneity within generations.9 For simplicity
we assume that a fraction of the population is myopic and does not save for
retirement as in Feldstein (1985) and Diamond (1965). To match the empirical
fact that non–savers are more likely to be found poor, we allow for the possibility
that they are less productive than savers. Although we believe that including
non–saving agents in the model is important, the results will not depend on this
aspect of the model.
Our economy offers a PAYG public pension system in which retirees get a
constant fraction of productive (saving) workers’ after tax labor income. As ben-
efits are lump sum and do not depend on past earnings, the effective replacement
rate is higher for the less productive non–saving agents, reflecting the progressive
9Empirical evidence shows that a sizeable fraction of the population has virtually no wealth
at retirement. A disproportionally large share of these non–savers belong to the low income
group in the population. According to the Hubbard, Skinner & Zeldes (1995) study of US
households, almost 50% of the 50–59 year old individuals without high school diploma have
nonhousing wealth below 50% of the after–tax income net of asset income, while the same
number for people with college degree is only 22% (high school diploma 31%). Even if housing
wealth is accounted for, only 70% of 50–59 year old people without a high school diploma have
net worth above the yearly after–tax income (4.6% among college graduates). Whether low
savings are due to myopic behavior, or an optimal response to the existence of social security
programs and borrowing constraints, is an open question.
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nature of most public pension systems. Hence our assumptions capture the fact
that public pension systems provide retirement income to individuals without
sufficient savings, and that it redistributes to low–income people.10
Our objective is to find a bound on the rate of technological progress which
is sufficient to hold a saver’s net wage as well as his consumption level at least
constant during the whole transition to an equilibrium with higher dependency
ratios. We will see that the required technological progress to keep after–tax
wages non–decreasing is lower than that needed for non–decreasing consumption,
as saving agents react to a longer expected retirement span by saving more, i.e. by
reducing consumption in the first period. If the consumption level of young saving
agents is not reduced, it is therefore automatically ensured that old–age pensions
and the consumption level of non–savers are non–decreasing. Retired savers, on
the other hand, might be affected by a fall in the rate of return on their savings,
a criterion we do not take into account. Rather, the implicit welfare criteria we
are using are the net wage level as well as the level of consumption attainable by
all non–capital income. These criteria are not only chosen for tractability, but
they also reflect the most important political concern to ensure a non–decreasing
living standard for both workers and the less wealthy retirees.
4.1 Population
Individuals live for two periods, and supply their labor inelastically11 in the first
period of their lives. The number of young agents is normalized to one and is
10According to Diamond’s (1977) classical framework for social security analysis, the three
most important rationales for providing a public pension system are income redistribution,
market failures, and paternalism.
11Closed–form solution to a model with elastic labor supply outside the steady state do not
exist even for a simple log–linear utility function.
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constant over time. Demographics are captured by the survival probability ψt to
live to the second period. Aging can thus conveniently be modeled as an increase
in the survival probability ψ, which can either be fully anticipated, or come as a
surprise. We will consider both cases below. As the number of young agents is
1, ψt also denotes period t dependency ratio.
Our economy is inhabited by two kinds of agents, savers and non–savers.
Savers (a fraction δ of the population) are optimizing agents, who save for re-
tirement taking into account the availability of pensions when old. Non–savers
(fraction 1−δ) consume their entire income when young, and solely rely on public
pension payments when old. The productivity of a non–saving agent is assumed
to be only a fraction ε ≤ 1 of an optimizing agent’s productivity. Consequently
the effective labor supply is
Lt = ∆ ≡ δ + (1− δ)ε ≤ 1. (3)
∆ can be also viewed as a measure for income inequality in the economy.12 The
smaller ∆, the higher the potential redistribution opportunities from high–income
to low–income individuals.
In industrialized countries a working life lasts approximately 40 years. Hence
we assume that one period in our model consists of 40 years. This implies an
expected retirement span of 10 to 20 years for survival probabilities between 0.25
and 0.5, which matches with actual life expectancy quite well.
12A more standard way to measure inequality — the Gini coefficient — can be easily computed
from the population parameters,
Gini =
δ(1− δ)(1− ε)







Output Y is produced by a constant returns to scale Cobb–Douglas technology,
Y = F (K,AL) = Kα(AL)1−α, 0 ≤ α < 1, (4)
where K is capital, L is labor, and A denotes the effectiveness of labor. Tech-
nological progress is Harrod–neutral, and productivity A is assumed to grow at
a constant exogenous rate g. We assume a 100% depreciation rate for capital,
such that the capital stock equals the amount of savings in the previous period.
Standard profit maximization yields factor prices, net (gross) interest rate rt (Rt)
and wage rate w,
Rt ≡ (1 + rt) = αk
α−1 (5)
wt = (1− α)k
α, (6)
where k ≡ K
AL
denotes capital per efficiency unit of labor, and the wage rate
is also given per efficiency unit of labor. High–income workers (savers) get a
compensation of Wt ≡ Atwt, while low–income workers (non–savers) get εWt ≡
εAtwt.
Note that if labor supply is inelastic, the factor prices in a given period are
completely determined by the savings decision of the working generation in the
previous period. So even if individuals forecast their survival probability (and
hence the dependency ratio in the following period) incorrectly, the realized factor
prices only depend on the forecasted, but not on the realized survival rate.
4.3 Consumers
Let cw,t and cr,t+1 denote consumption of an agent born in period t in the first
(= worker) and second period (= retiree) of his/her life. To get closed form
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solutions, instantaneous utility is logarithmic. Second period utiliy is discounted
by a constant factor β, and by the anticipated probability to live to the second
period, ψet+1.
13 Lifetime utility is therefore given by
Ut = log cw,t + βψ
e
t+1 log cr,t+1. (7)
Accidential bequest in case of death after the first period is distributed evenly
among the surviving members of the same generation. This is equivalent to
the existence of a perfect annuity market (or an actuarially fair funded pension
system), in which the applicable (anticipated) rate of return is Rt/ψet .
14
While non–savers consume their entire labor or pension income in the respec-
tive periods, savers maximize their lifetime utility (7) with respect to the budget
constraints






where τ denotes the proportional payroll tax used to finance pensions B. The
budget constraints can be used to substitute consumption in the utility func-
tion (7). Taken the paths of factor prices as given, the optimization problem









13The superscript e is used to denote anticipated values of parameters.
14While not entirely innocuous, this assumption is the least arbitrary and most tractable
way to distribute accidential bequests. As long as these bequests are distributed among the old
generation, our results are not sensitive to the exact distribution scheme. An alternative way
to interpret ψ is the length of retirement. The relevant interest rate is then R. While the re-
sulting expressions are slightly more complicated, the main results remain basically unchanged.
Moreover, it is mitigated by the fact that only saving agents will purchase annuities.
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As mentioned before, the realized gross interest rate Rt+1 depends only on the
generation’s anticipated dependency ratio ψet+1, but not on the realized ψt+1.
Future benefits B and the annuity rate of return R/ψ, however will depend on
the realized survival probability ψ.
4.4 Public Pensions
The public pension system is PAYG. Let λ be the fraction of after–tax income of
the current high–income young savers, which is paid out as a lump sum pension
benefit B to all current old, Bt = λWt(1 − τt). We require the wage–indexation
factor to be constant, even if the demographic composition of the population
changes. Note that λ is not a replacement rate, but a proportionality factor
between current pension benefits and current wages, similar to most European
countries where benefits are de facto indexed to wages. In a steady state, this
indexation translates to a replacement rate of (1 + g)λ. For non–savers, the
effective steady–state replacement rate is higher than for savers (= (1 + g)λ
ε
).
The average wage indexation factor is given by λ
∆
.
As the public pension budget is requested to be balanced in every period,
ψtBt = ∆Wtτ , the PAYG programme is fully specified by the proportionality
























In equilibrium Wt ≡ Atwt and Rt in the FOC (10) correspond to the relevant
equilibrium factor prices (5) and (6), while Bt and τt are given in (11) and (12).
The resulting optimal savings and consumption decisions of high–income agents






















Capital fully depreciates, and hence end–of–period savings constitutes the capital
stock in the next period. Recall that only a fraction δ of the population saves,
yielding
Kt+1 = St = δst.














(1− α)αβδψet+1(∆ + λψ
e
t+1)
(1 + g)(∆ + λψt)
{













The steady state capital stock per efficiency unit of labor for a constant survival
rate ψ is therefore given by




Note that the law of motion (15) traces out a concave locus in a kt–kt+1 diagram
(see Figure 2). A once–and–for–all increase in the survival probability form ψo
to ψn will lead to a new steady state capital stock per efficiency unit of labor.
The transition, however, will depend on whether the decrease in mortality is
anticipated or not.
4.6 The Effects of an Aging Shock
Let us assume the economy was in a steady state (ψv ≡ ψo for v ≤ t). From period
t+1 onwards, the new dependency ratio (= survival probability to second period)
is given by ψn > ψo. We restrict the new survival probability by assumption A:









Note that an upper bound for ψn below 1 applies only for large discount factors
β and/or very high average wage indexation λ
∆
.15 Even if λ is large, assumption
A is easily satisfied provided there are not too few savers, and/or that non–savers
are not too unproductive.
Taking into account assumption A, we can say more about the new steady
state capital stock and about transition dynamics, as summarized in the Lemma
below.
Lemma: i) For all ψo and ψn, T (ψo, ψn) =
∆+λψn
∆+λψo
T (ψn, ψn). ii) If assumption
A holds, T (ψn, ψn) ≥ T (ψo, ψo).
Proof: See appendix.
The Lemma shows that assumption A is sufficient (though not necessary) to
15A non–negative rate of time preference (i.e. β ≤ 1) implies that the average proportionality
factor between wages and pensions would have to be greater than 1 to violate assumption A.
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ensure that the new steady state capital stock per efficiency unit of labor is higher
after aging.16 Hence interest rates are smaller and wage rates are higher than
in the pre–aging steady state. The dynamics of the model can be conveniently
read off from a standard kt–kt+1 diagram (Figure 2). There are three loci, whose
relative positions under assumption A are given by Too ≤ Tnn ≤ Ton, where Txy
is an abbreviation for T (ψx, ψy).
Insert Figure 2
If agents are taken by surprise by an increase in the survival probability, the
realized ψt+1 will be greater than the anticipated rate (ψet+1 = ψt < ψt+1). While
in period t + 1 the capital stock is still at its old steady state, in period t + 2
it jumps up to a higher value on the Tnn locus. The capital stock now increases
monotonically to its new steady state position, implying that the move in factor
prices (wage rates increasing and interest rates decreasing) is also monotonic.
Obviously the highest potential decline in young agents’ consumption occurs
between periods t and t + 1. Young saving agents in period t + 1 face a higher
dependency burden plus a higher incentive to save in view of an increase in the
survival rate.
The dynamics are somewhat different if aging has been anticipated one period
ahead, i.e. in period t. Young agents in t will increase their savings rate compared
to the previous period, making up for an increased survival probability. At the
same time, the dependency ratio in period t is still low. The increase in the
capital stock in period t + 1 (the new capital stock can be found on locus Ton)
will therefore be higher than the corresponding jump in the capital stock in period
t+2 for the previous surprise case. Note that — unlike in the surprise case — the









capital stock might even overshoot its new steady state. In period t + 3 capital
stock moves to a value on the Tnn, locus whereafter it grows or falls monotonically
to its steady state. As a consequence, wage and interest rates might also show
a non–monotonic pattern after the anticipated shock in survival probability. In
contrast to the previous case, the largest relative burden during the transition in
terms of first–period consumption are experienced by both generations born in
periods t and t+ 1. The former faces a shift in utility weight towards the second
period, reducing first–period consumption due to higher savings. The latter faces
higher tax rates due to an increase in the dependency ratio.
Theorem 2 gives upper bounds for rates of technological progress needed to
avoid a decline net wages and in first–period consumption of saving agents. Note
that if savers’ net wages do not fall, neither do non–savers’ net wages nor do the
retirement benefits, since both are proportional to savers’ net wages. Further-
more, as non–savers consume their whole net–wage in the first period, and their
benefits in the second, this also implies that their consumption in both periods
does not decrease.
Theorem 2: Under assumption A the following holds
i) The sufficient growth rate g∗w to avoid a decline in net wages — and
therefore also a decline in the benefit level — for all generations is
bounded above by










ii) The sufficient growth rate g∗c to keep young saving agents’ consumption
at least constant for all generations is bounded above by















These bounds hold on a period per period base during the whole transition for
both polar anticipation schemes. Theorem 2 applies not only to generations living
in or near steady state, but also to “transition” generations, i.e. those who suffer
the greatest impact from aging. The required rates of technological progress, g∗w
and g∗c , echo the derived bounds from our back–of–the envelope calculation in
section 2, and from the static model with elastic labor supply in section 3. With
full (average) replacement ( λ
∆






ratio of the fraction of workers in the population.
The rates g∗c and g
∗
w are increasing functions of the average proportionality
factor λ
∆
, i.e. the size of the existing program. The computed growth rate g∗c
differs in two ways from the required rate of technological progress in the last
section: First, holding the wage–benefit proportionality constant, the presence
of non–optimizing households increases the burden of aging. For a given λ, the
greater the fraction of non–savers the greater the required growth rate to maintain
the current living standard during the transition. The presence of non–optimizing
households also increases the degree of redistribution of a public pension system.
Second, an increase in the survival probability increases the utility weight of
second–period consumption and makes saving agents save more, ceteris paribus.
Note that this shift only occurs once in both cases, namely for the period in
which the higher dependency burden becomes known. The second factor in (17),
(1+βψn)
(1+βψo)
, compensates young saving agents for this loss in first–period consump-
tion compared to the previous generation. After the shift in utility weights the
sufficient growth rate to keep consumption constant is bounded by g∗w as given
in (16).
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Some numerical values for the derived bounds are given in Table 2. We have
assumed that a working life (i.e. one period of the OLG–model) lasts 40 years.
The required rates of technological progress g∗w and g
∗
c depend positively on the
average proportionality factor λ
∆
, and hence we report the values for the rather
extreme case of λ
∆
= 0.8, and the more moderate case of λ
∆
= 0.4. Furthermore,
g∗c also depends positively on the discount factor β. While most empirical studies
get a yearly estimate of about 0.94–0.98 (i.e. for a 40–years period, β ∈ [.08, .45]),
microeconometric estimates find value of β = 1 not implausible if mortality risk
is accounted for. We report numerical values for β = 0.5 and β = 1 in Table 2.
Insert Table 2
The growth rates g∗w and g
∗
c are highest for Italy for the period 2005-2045. But
even in this case, and with rather extreme parameter values of λ
∆
= 0.8 and β = 1,
g∗c is 0.607 (g
∗
w = 0.244) for the entire 40–year period. This translates into a yearly
productivity growth rate of 1.19% (0.55%), a rate lower than the productivity
growth rates experienced in most countries. Our conclusion is reinforced by
looking at a more moderate example, like that of the US between 2005-2045,
with a necessary yearly productivity growth rate of at most 0.45% (for λ
∆
= 0.8
and β = 1). The growth rates necessary to keep net wages constant are always
considerably smaller.
The derived upper bounds for technological growth from Theorem 2, g∗c and
g∗w, only depend on the average proportionality factor
λ
∆
and the discount factor
β, but not on capital share α or the exact composition of the population (sum-
marized by δ and ε). Tighter bounds on the necessary productivity growth rates
— denoted by g∗∗c — can be found by comparing saving workers’ consumption
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and net wages over the whole transition path to a new equilibrium.17 The tighter
bound g∗∗c does, however, also depend on capital share and the composition of
the population, often in a non–monotonous way. As is obvious from Table 2, the
bounds of Theorem 2 overstate the necessary degree of technological progress by
a factor two, appproximately.18
Hence, the adverse effects of aging and of the resulting higher contribution
rates on capital accumulation can be offset by technological progress, and the
public pension system can be sustained without a decrease in workers’ income
and consumption or in the benefits of the retirees. The required growth rate,
however, is positively related to the generosity of the existing pension program.
5 Conclusions
There is increasing concern that social security is not viable for aging populations,
as projected for almost all OECD countries. Substantial increases in old–age
dependency ratios call for large adjustments in contribution rates and/or benefit
levels, which — in the absence of economic growth — will lead to a declining living
standard for workers and/or retirees. If benefits are closely related to current net–
wages, an empirical regularity for most European countries, the burden of aging
is somewhat shared between the generations.
In this paper, we have asked whether economic growth can offset the negative
17The sufficient degree of technological progress differs over the transition path. As our
implicit welfare criterion is to ensure a non–decreasing consumption for all generations, this
bound is less relevant. The interested reader is refered to the proof of Theorem 2 (in the
Appendix) for details.
18While the tight bound depends on the capital shares, the population parameters δ and ε
turned out to be of minor importance numerically, and were therefore not included.
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impact of aging if the current structure of the social security system remain
untouched. Instead of imposing assumptions on the rate of technological progress,
we inverted the question and investigated which rate of technological progress is
sufficient to maintain the living standard of workers (despite higher contribution
rates), and the living standard of the needier retirees. We also account for the
fact that some agents are not forward looking (non–savers), and hence solely rely
of pension payments when old. Furthermore, in close resemblance to existing
PAYG systems, there is some redistribution from high–income to low–income
earners. Both of these features, however, do not change the qualitative results of
our paper.
Our analysis shows that a moderate rate of technological progress might be
sufficient to maintain the living standard for all workers and retirees without
assets. This does not mean, however, that reforms are not necessary. Any increase
in the legal retirement age, for example, would reduce the rate of technological
progress necessary to avoid a decline in the living standard.19 We have also
shown that the size of the social security program matters. The required degree
of technological progress increases in the average proportionality factor between
current wages and current benefits. Holding the replacement rate for saving
agents constant, the average proportionality factor increases in the degree of
redistribution from high–income to low–income workers.
We have taken a number of shortcuts to derive a simple analytical bound
on the required growth rate. A major shortcoming of our dynamic model is
the assumption of inelastic labor supply. Note, however, that a shift in utility
19An alternative to increasing the retirement age would be to foster immigration. Storesletten
(1999), for example, provides a very careful calibration exercise of the necessary degree of
immigration for the US.
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weight towards the second period of an agent’s life (due to an increase in expected
longevity) ceteris paribus lessens the disutility of work in the first period. The way
aging is modeled here would most probably lead to an increase in labor supply
for forward–looking agents.20 Closely related is the problem that higher tax rates
usually lead to increases in the informal sector, an important feature not captured
by our setup. As a final shortcut, aging is captured by a single parameter, the
probability of reaching the retirement state. In reality, demographic developments
also depend on fertility rates, and possible variations in the length of a typical
working life.
Notwithstanding such possible objections, our analysis shows that aging per
se does not necessarily entail a decline in consumption opportunities. Rather,
the real challenge for public pension systems is a political one: The large and
growing intergenerational redistribution existing programs imply might not be
sustainable.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma
We have to prove that i) T (ψo, ψn) =
∆+λψn
∆+λψo






i) Follows directly from the definition of T (·, ·) in equation (15).
ii) For constant a survival probability ψ we can define





δλψ + α(∆(1 + βψ) + λψ(1− δ + βψ))
}





δλψ + α(∆(1 + βψ) + λψ(1− δ + βψ))
}2




A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
We have to show that
i) the sufficient growth rate g∗w to keep young–agents net wage constant is bounded















ii) the sufficient growth rate g∗c to keep young agents’ consumption at least constant






















We proceed in two steps: We first show that a young saving agent’s consumption level
can be maintained throughout the transition period in a setting in which agents are
29
taken by surprise by a sudden aging of the population (ψet+1 = ψo, and ψt+1 = ψn).
Then we show the same for an economy in which aging has been fully anticipated
(ψet+1 = ψt+1 = ψn). For simplicity, it is assumed that the economy is in a steady state
before aging takes place, i.e. that the steady state capital stock per efficiency unit of
labor is k̃ = T (ψ0, ψ0)
1
1−α .
For convenience, we state again young saving agent’s consumption for the two
periods prior to aging (t and t− 1) and all periods after a once–and–for all increase in

































, for i ≥ 1. (20)
Moreover, note that capital stock evolves as in the law of motion (15), i.e.




kt+i = T (ψn, ψn)k
α
t+i−1, for i ≥ 2







Recall that Too ≡ T (ψo, ψo), Ton ≡ T (ψo, ψn), and Tnn ≡ T (ψn, ψn).
A.2.1 Non–anticipated aging
If agents are taken by surprise, ψet+1 = ψo and T (ψt, ψ
e
t+1) = Too. Note that as
cw,t = (1+g)cw,t−1, and Wt = (1+g)Wt−1, consumption and net wages in t are greater
than in t− 1 for a nonnegative rate of technological progress.
The comparison for the two subsequent periods is
cw,t+1
cw,t













As according to the Lemma, Tnn ≥ Too, the last term on the right hand side is greater









− 1. Because the increase in the survival probability —
and hence the dependency ratio — has been unanticipated, the gross wage rate per
efficiency unit of labor in t + 1 is the same as in t. According to equation (12), the
necessary and sufficient growth rate to offset a decrease in net wages (1− τ)W is thus
exactly g∗c .
From period (t + 1) onwards, the share of retired people is constant. The only
determinant of saving young agents’ consumption ratio
cw,t+2+i
cw,t+1+i
for i ≥ 0 — apart
from the exogenous growth rate g — is the ratio of capital stocks as can be seen
by equation (20). Recall that in the surprise aging case, the capital stock increases
monotonically to its new steady state value. A non–negative growth rate suffices to
guarantee non–decreasing consumption, and non–decreasing wages and benefits.
A.2.2 Anticipated aging
If aging is fully anticipated, ψet+1 = ψn and T (ψt, ψ
e
t+1) = Ton. Therefore
cw,t
cw,t−1















The last term on the right hand side is greater than 1, and the sufficient rate of
technological progress to ensure non–decreasing consumption is at most g∗c . As the
dependency ratio in t is still at its initial level ψo and the gross wage rate per efficiency
unit of labor is constant (steady state), a non–decreasing rate of technological progress
suffices to offset a decrease in net wages and benefits.






















, and k̃α = k̃Too (the economy was at steady state prior to aging).
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From period (t+ 2) onwards, the capital stock increases monotonically to its new
steady state value as argued above for the unanticipated case. There is, however, a
potential drop in capital per efficiency unit of labor between periods (t+1) and (t+2),
which could translate into a decrease in the net wage wage and/or a decrease in saving


























As Ton = Tnn
∆+λψn
∆+λψo













































Country Dependency Labor productivity
ratios ψ growth (per year)
2000 2050 g interval
France 0.240 0.423 2.29% (1972–1990)
Germany 0.234 0.536 1.70% (1978–1990)
Italy 0.260 0.651 2.15% (1971–1990)
Japan 0.240 0.559 3.19% (1970–1990)
UK 0.234 0.381 2.02% (1968–1990)
US 0.189 0.344 0.85% (1972–1990)
Table 1: Actual and forecasted old–age dependency ratios and growth rates in
labor productivity for the most important industrialized countries.
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0.285 0.660 0.8 1.0 0.244 0.607 0.409 (α = 0.1) s
Italy 0.297 (α = 13) s
(2005) (2045) 0.250 (α = 12) a
0.8 0.5 0.244 0.467
0.4 1.0 0.135 0.449
0.4 0.5 0.135 0.321
0.185 0.339 0.8 1.0 0.107 0.251 0.157 (α = 0.1) s
USA 0.102 (α = 13) a
(2005) (2045) 0.115 (α = 12) a
0.8 0.5 0.107 0.195
0.4 1.0 0.057 0.185
0.4 0.5 0.057 0.132
Table 2: Upper bounds on growth rates to avoid a decline in net–wage g∗w, and
to avoid a decline in saving agents’ working age consumption, g∗c , for an OLG
economy. The letters in the last column (s=surprise and a=anticipated) indicate
for which of the two polar anticipation schemes the tighter upper bound g∗∗c
binds. (The detailed population parameters are λ = 0.5 (0.25) for λ/∆ = 0.8
(0.4), ε = 0.25, and δ = 0.5.)
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Figure 2: Transition dynamics after a once–and–for all increase in the survival
probability ψ.
The locus Ton is only relevant for the full anticipation case.
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